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"TWO HIJACKERS SLAIN IN JET GUNFIGHT, PASSENGER
DEAD." This headline greeted millions of Americans as they awoke on
Thursday morning July 6, 1972; another grim reminder that the
hijacking problem was still present. On July 5, 1972, eighty-six persons
'boarded Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 710 at Sacramento bound
f6r San Francisco and Los Angeles. Unbeknown to eighty-four persons
on board, two of the would-be passengers: Dimitr Alexiev and Michael
Dimitrov Azmanoff, had another destination in mind. Shortly after
takeoff the two men armed with three pistols and a knife commandeered
ihe airliner, demanded $800,000, and announced that Siberia was their
destination. In the ensuing hours three persons were killed and two
seriously injured, while the others sat in a state of fear and despair as
F.B.I. agents battled the hijackers. One of those killed was E. H. Stan-
ley Carter, age 66, formerly of Quebec, Canada, who was flying with
his wife to San Diego where the couple planned to retire. His death had
once again brought to the forefront the plight faced by American
civil aviation.'I In the recent past, unlawful seizure of aircraft and its counterpart,
unlawful interference with aircraft, has come to constitute a plight
common to both American and international civil aviation. What was
once the occasional and bizarre has become the ordinary and expected.
During the last decade these criminal acts have resulted in loss of life,
*Member, New York Bar. J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1970;
L.L.M., Columbia University, 1971.
: % The author would like to extend his appreciation to Richard Drucker, a third year
law student at the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, for his
valuable assistance in the research and preparation of this article.
1. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
The magnitude of the hijacking problem is illustrated by the fact that, at the
same time that the Pacific Southwest airliner was being hijacked in California, another
attempted hijacking occurred at Buffalo, New York. A twenty-three year old Buffalo man
was arrested after he had held his eighteen month old daughter hostage at knife point
aboard an American Airlines 707 jet at Greater Buffalo International Airport, and
threatened to kill her unless his demands to be flown to a foreign country were met.
After several hours of tense negotiations, the would-be hijacker surrendered to police.
N.Y. Times, July 6, 1972, at 20, col. 3.
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serious injury and substantial economic loss. Hijackers' unlawful ac-
tions have progressed from the temporary seizure of an aircraft and its
passengers, 2 to the detention of an entire passenger load and crew for
several weeks under intolerable conditions in a desert,3 to the maiming
of a co-pilot,4 and finally to the killing of innocent passengersr and a
stewardess in flight.6 In the unlawful interference sphere, the illegal
activity has ranged from the shelling of an aircraft, 7 to the maiming
and killing of passengers, 8 and to the destruction of an aircraft and the
annihilation of all passengers and crew.9
During the past eleven years, more than 152 hijackings of aircraft
in United States air commerce have occurred.' 0 A recent compilation by
the Federal Aviation Administration shows that there have been just
under 200 persons involved in the hijackings of planes in United States
air commerce since mid-1961. In a few instances, the planes were small
private craft, but the great majority were large airliners. More than
half of the culprits involved-108 to be exact-are listed as fugitives.
This includes a number of so-called passive companions who have been
indicted along with the hijackers who plotted and carried out the
crimes. Of the fugitives, 90 percent or more are either believed to be in
Cuba or to have moved on to points unknown after originally hijacking
planes to Cuba. Of the approximately ninety persons involved in hi-
jackings who have been taken into custody, thirty-nine have been con-
victed under one statute or another." Five of the convictions have
been in foreign countries where the hijacked planes landed. About ten
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1969, at 18, col. 3 (one of the numerous hijackings
to Cuba).
3. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
4. This incident occurred during a succesful hijacking from Russia to Turkey.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
5. See, e.g., text at supra note 1; N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
6. See supra note 4.
7. On February 18, 1969, four Arab terrorists attacked an El Al plane in Zurich.
Six passengers were seriously injured in the incident. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1969, at 1,
col. 6.
8. On December 26, 1968, an El Al plane in Athens, Greece was shelled. In this
incident Leon Sherdan, an Israeli engineer, was killed and a number of others were
injured. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
9. A Swissair aircraft was destroyed in flight, killing all the passengers and crew
on February 21, 1970. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
10. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1972, at 13, col. 1.
11. In the United States "[a] compilation by the Federal Aviation Administration of
sentences imposed in domestic cases since May 1, 1961, shows: one life term, one for
50 years, one for 45 years, [one for] 45 year[s] ... , one for 25, eight for 20, and about 10
ranging from five to 15 years." Id.
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of the convictions have been for aircraft piracy for which the minimum
term under federal law is now twenty years. In some of these cases, there
has been a companion charge of kidnapping. At least ten of the hi-
jackers were convicted for unlawful interference with a flight crew
member-a crime that allows a maximum term of twenty years and a
$10,000 fine. If a deadly weapon is used, there is no limitation on the
jail term which may be imposed. The five foreign convictions have
brought sentences that, on the average, have been much more lenient
than those imposed in this country.12
A brief analysis of the hijackings which have occurred since 1961
demonstrates that five basic types of hijackers may be identified. First,
is the disgruntled national, who unlawfully seizes an aircraft and directs
it to fly to a country whose political ideology he shares and admires.13
Secondly, there is the so-called "flying commando" who has taken his
cause's battle to the air.' 4 Rather than merely desiring free transporta-
tion from one country to another, the "flying commando" is bent on
the triple goal of political blackmail, the destruction of the aircraft,
and the incarceration or death of its passengers.' 5 While the former
simply desires to change his place of residence, the latter is set on de-
stroying the lives and property of those he perceives to be his enemies.
While the disgruntled national hopes that the state of landing will ac-
12. The most publicized case was that of Raffaele Minichielle the A.W.O.L.
marine who hijacked a Trans-World Airlines jet from California to Rome in November,
1969. His original sentence of seven and a half years was reduced to two and a half
years, and he was released in May, 1971. Hailed as something of a folk hero by certain
elements of the Italian public, he is now reported to be working in Italy. In the other
foreign cases, Albert C. Cadon was released by the Mexicans after serving an eight
year and nine month sentence for robbery and illegal possession of firearms in the hi-
jacking of a Pan American World Airways jet; Christian Belon served nine months in
Lebanon after diverting a Paris-to-Rome T.W.A. jet to Beirut; and Robert L. Jackson and
Ligia Sanchez-Archilla are serving five and three years respectively in Argentina after
hijacking a Mexico City-to-San Antonio Braniff Airways jet to Buenos Aires. Id.
13. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1969, at 18, col. 3 (one of the numerous hi-
jackings to Cuba).
14. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
15. On September 6, 1970, members of the Palestine Liberation Front successfully
hijacked a T.W.A., a Swissair, and a Pan American World Airways jet, and forced
them to land in Jordan. The passengers were held hostage and the jetliners were sub-
sequently destroyed. Id.
See also N.Y. Times, May 10, 1972, at 1, col. 2. On May 9, 1972, Arab guerillas,
members of the underground Black September Organization, seized control of a Sabena
airliner during a flight from Vienna to Lydda. The airliner landed in Lydda airport
where the guerillas intended to exchange the passengers for 317 of their comrades who
were being held in Israeli prisons. In the hours that ensued, Israeli paratroopers re-
gained control of the aircraft killing two of the perpetrators and wounding another.
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cept him, the "flying commando" normally has the approval and the
cooperation of his country and neighboring states which share his po-
litical attitudes. Once he succeeds in bringing the aircraft and his cap-
tives to these countries, he is rewarded in that his prisoners rather than
he are detained. Thirdly, there is the mentally deranged individual
who has chosen hijacking as a device to gain recognition.'" Fourthly, is
the common criminal who uses the aircraft as a vehicle of escape from
pending prosecution or incarceration. 17 Finally, there is the newest
type of hijacker, the extortionist. 18 Unlike the common criminal, the
extortionist has chosen the hijacking route as an avenue to instant
wealth. Although it is theoretically possible to delineate five distinct
types of hijackers, situations frequently arise where two or more of these
motivating forces operate simultaneously within a single hijacking
incident. 19
Although each hijacker is an individual who is driven by a unique
motivating force, hijackers in general do appear to possess some common
characteristics. All are unconcerned with the health and the welfare
of the passengers and crew; and all are not disturbed in the least with
the economic loss which often results from their criminal ventures.
In an effort to combat and to deter future hijackings, the United
States Government, in cooperation with the airline industry, has de-
vised an anti-hijacking security system. 20 This article seeks to determine
whether the currently used security measures are adequate to protect
the constitutional rights of the American flying public; and if not,
whether effective security procedures can be devised wherein no con-
stitutional rights will be violated. More specifically, this article will ana-
lyze the methods which are currently being utilized in an attempt to
thwart future hijackings in light of the fourth amendment's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures. Furthermore, careful
attention will be focused on the possible derogation of the constitu-
tional right to travel. While it is recognized that the hijacking problem
16. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
17. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 26, 1972, at 70, col. 1.
18. This type of hijacking has become the most common in the past year. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, July 13, 1972, at 1, col. 3. As of July 16, 1972, more than sixteen
attempts to hijack airliners for the purpose of extortion were attempted. N.Y. Times,
July 16, 1972, § 4, at 4, col. 1.
19. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 4, 1972, at 1, col. 8. (One of a series of recent
hijackings undertaken by supporters of the Black Panther Party). These hijackings
involve both political motivations and extortion.
20. AVIATION WEEK & SPAcF TEcHNOLOoY, Dec. 29, 1969, at 32.
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poses a serious threat to civil aviation throughout the world, the primary
purpose of this article is to resolve the constitutional problems which
may be present, or which may arise, in the prevention of unlawful
seizure of aircraft in the United States.
2 '
I. THE ANTI-HIJACKING SECURITY SYSTEM
AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The right of an American citizen to travel unimpeded has long
been regarded as a fundamental right by our courts. While there is no
specific provision in the Constitution insuring the right to travel, our
courts as early as 1825, in the case of Corfield v. Coryell,2 2 recognized
this right as one of the privileges and immunities enjoyed by American
citizens. In Corfield, Justice Washington stated that the right of a
citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
whether for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits or
otherwise is one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed to our
citizens by article four, section two of our Constitution.
23
Some courts, while differing as to the source of this cherished
right, have nevertheless continued throughout our history to treat it
as a fundamental one. In Edwards v. California,24 and Twining v. New
Jersey,25 the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
constitutional right to travel derives from the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, in cases involv-
ing the right to travel abroad such as Kent v. Dulles,2 6 Aptheker v. Sec-
retary of State,27 and Zemel v. Rusk,28 the Supreme Court of the United
States has validated the notion that the right to travel emanates from
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In Kent, the Court clearly
delineated this right when it stated:
[T]he right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which citizens cannot be
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amend-
21. This article does not attempt to deal with the legal problems faced by foreign
countries which are currently undertaking anti-hijacking security measures.
22. 6 F. Gas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
23. For other cases which hold that the constitutional right to travel emanates
from the privileges and immunities clause, see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
180 (1869); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870).
24. 314 U.S. 160, 180-86 (1941) (concurring opinion).
25. 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
26. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
27. 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964).
28. 381 U.S. 14 (1965).
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ment .... Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction,
and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad,
like travel within the country... may be as close to the heart of the
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom
of movement is basic in our scheme of values.29
In the recent case of Shapiro v. Thompson,0 the Supreme Court
of the United States once again reiterated this rationale when it stated:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union
and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that
all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our
land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably
burden or restrict this movement.31
In light of the courts' often expressed determination to safeguard
the right to travel, the question arises as to whether the use of the mag-
netometer and the behavioral profile of the hijacker somehow violates
the right of every American citizen to travel free from unreasonable
restrictions. In attempting to resolve this issue, several corollary ques-
tions are raised: (1) Is the constitutional right to travel an absolute?
(2) Is there an absolute right to fly? (3) Are the security measures cur-
rently in use within the bounds of permissible police power and the
contours of reasonableness?
It is submitted that while the right to travel is an important and
cherished one, it is by no means absolute. Under certain circumstances
the state or federal government may, within the scope of its police
power, reasonably curtail or regulate it. For example, there is no
doubt that citizens have a right to use the highways of our land. How-
ever, there is also little doubt that they may be prevented from doing
so if they are inebriated, unlicensed, have failed to pay their tolls, or
are driving in a reckless manner. The notion that the right to travel is
not absolute is clearly evinced by a careful analysis of Zemel v. Rush. 3 2
There the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he right to travel within the United States is of course also consti-
tutionally protected; cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160. But that
freedom does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire, or pestilence
cannot be quarantined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited
29. 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958).
30. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
31. Id. at 629.
32. 381 U.S. 14 (1965).
ANTI-HIJACKING SECURITY
travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety
and welfare of the area or the Nation as a whole. So it is with interna-
tional travel. That the restriction which is challenged in this case is
supported by the weightiest considerations of national security is per-
haps best pointed up by recalling that the Cuban missile crisis of Octo-
ber 1962 preceded the filing of appellant's complaint by less than two
months.
33
Chief Justice Warren succinctly summed up the majority's point of
i'iew when he stated: "[T]hat a liberty cannot be inhibited without due
process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be
inhibited.1
34
In .Shapiro, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down
the one year residency requirements for welfare recipients which were
enacted by Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia.
The Court held that the residency statutes of these states created a
classification which denied equal protection under the laws and un-
constitutionally denied the poor the right to travel. In arriving at its
decision the Court stated:
[I]n moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees
were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which
serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.
Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361
US. 516, 524 (1960) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).35
It is postulated that the Court struck down these statutes as un-
constitutional interferences with the right to travel in that they singled
out one particular group-the poor-on no basis other than their
poverty and potential for burdening the welfare roles of a sister state.
Understandably, this objective was not viewed by the Court as a com-
pelling governmental interest. On the other hand, the Court did not
go so far as to hold that the right to travel was absolute. The Court
specifically stated that its opposition was to the promulgation of statutes
or rules which unreasonably impede the right to travel. Implicit in the
Court's ruling was the rationale that if the rules promulgated were
necessary to promote a vital governmental interest and were reasonable,
33. Id. at 15-16.
34. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
35. 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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the Court would uphold them. This theory is supported by a careful
analysis of the Court's decision in Zemel. There the Court indicated
that right to travel cases involve a two-pronged issue: (1) the extent
of the governmental restriction imposed, and (2) the nature of the
justification for the restriction. In light of both the Zemel standard and
the compelling governmental interest rationale of the Court in Sha-
piro (perhaps no more than an alternate statement of the same stand-
ard), the requirement for consent to be searched as a prerequisite to
boarding is reasonable in light of the magnitude of the hijacking
menace. It is submitted that the anti-hijacking system currently em-
ployed, when coupled with the suggestions and modifications proposed
herein, is both reasonable and necessary. It does not unconstitutionally
classify one group on the basis of race, color, creed, or economic factors,
nor does it discriminatively single out the members of any group from
the rest of airline patrons. Furthermore, it does not deny any person
the right to travel who can satisfy the law enforcement authorities that
he is unarmed. The present anti-hijacking system, when coupled with
the modifications suggested herein, represents an attempt to secure
the constitutional right to travel rather than to infringe upon it. This
valued right has little meaning to a passenger who is forced to spend
two weeks under intolerable conditions in the desert, or who is held
captive in a hostile port. Neither can the constant fear of what a de-
ranged or criminally motivated hijacker may do in mid-air, be com-
pared to a restriction which involves a brief inspection by law en-
forcement agents in a friendly airport.
Moreover, it may be argued that the present anti-hijacking secur-
ity system does not derogate the constitutional right to travel because,
even if some persons are deterred from reaching their destination by
plane, it does not prevent them from resorting to other means of
transportation. An individual planning a domestic journey who is un-
willing to undergo a possible search may alternatively make use of a
private automobile, a train, or a bus to reach his destination. An in-
ternational traveler who does not wish to expose himself to the security
system or who is personally offended by it, may reach his destination
via ship.36
36. See 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970) which provides:
Subject to reasonable . . . regulations prescribed by the Administrator [of the
Federal Aviation Administration] any air carrier is authorized to refuse trans-
portation to a passenger . . . when, in the opinion of the air carrier, such
transportation... might be inimical to safety of flight.
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II. THE CURRENT ANTI-HIJACKING SECURITY SYSTEM
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In an effort to combat the ubiquitous hijacking menace, the United
States Government, with the cooperation of the airline industry, has
instituted a two-part security procedure designed to prevent would-be
hijackers from boarding aircraft within the United States. The princi-
pal elements in this program are the deployment of the "hijacker be-
havioral profile" and the magnetometer.37 Under the current program,
certain airline personnel are in charge of screening out potential perpe-
trators. Selected airline employees are made privy to the contents of
the "hijacker behavioral profile," which consists of a set of behavioral
characteristics believed to be common to all potential hijackers. These
characteristics, which were first compiled by a special task force insti-
tuted by the Federal Aviation Administration in 1969, are updated pe-
riodically as new information, concerning more recent hijackings, be-
comes available. This screening procedure and the use of the mag-
netometer-a mechanical metal-detecting device-are currently the
mainstays of the aircraft security program.
As part of one security technique currently in use, a magnetometer
is installed in the boarding passageway leading to the aircraft so that all
passengers must pass through it. It is designed to flash a warning light
when a metal object of magnetic force equal to or greater than an aver-
age .25 caliber pistol is brought within its operational range.38 If a pro-
37. Another major aspect in the effort to combat hijacking is the assignment of
"sky-marshals" to certain planes in an attempt to subdue and apprehend the hijacker
in the event that he succeeds in boarding the aircraft. It is estimated that approxi-
mately 1,200 Treasury Department Agents are presently assigned to the force. N.Y.
Times, July 24, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
38. In United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) the district
'court described the processes which underlie the use of the magnetometer as follows:
Its operation is based upon the physical fact that the earth is surrounded
by a relatively constant magnetic field composed of lines of flux. Steel and
other ferromagnetic metals are much better conductors than the air. As a
result, when any such metal moves through an area, nearby magnetic lines of
flux are distorted to some degree as they tend to converge and pass through
the metal while seeking the path of least resistance. Such distortions occurring
near a "fluxgate magnetometer" create a signal which can be amplified and
calibrated to detect magnetic disturbances. See, e.g., Chapman, The Earth's
Magnetism, 10-12, 17-19, 27, 28 (2d ed. 1951); J. Jaquet, No-Touch Frisk
Electronic Weapons Detection paper presented at Conference on Electronic
Crime Countermeasures, Univ. of Ky., April 22, 1971; Marshall, An Analytic
Model for the Fluxgate Magnetometer, IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, Vol.
MAG-3, No. 3 (Sept. 1967); Geyger, Flux-Gate Magnetometer Uses Toroidal
Core, Electronics (June 1, 1962); Geyger, The Ring-Core Magnetometer-A
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spective passenger exhibits traits contained in the hijacker behavioral
profile and activates the magnetometer in the process of boarding the
craft, he is interviewed by airline personnel. Apparently, "if he pro-
vides satisfactory identification he is permitted to board [without im-
pediment]." 39 On the other hand, if the airline personnel are not satis-
fied with the interview, the potential passenger is not allowed to board
until a deputy United States Marshal is summoned. The marshal should
once again request identification from the passenger. If such identifica-
tion is not furnished, the "selectee" is asked to go through the mag-
netometer once more. Prior to going through the reboarding process,
the selectee is asked if he has any metal objects in his possession. If he
replies in the negative and still activates the magnetometer, he is re-
quested to undergo a voluntary search before he is permitted to board
the aircraft. Apparently, if he refuses to undergo a voluntary search he
is merely denied the right to board the craft and is not subjected to
an involuntary search.
In order to analyze adequately the effectiveness of the mag-
netometer and of its adjunct, the behavioral profile system, a brief dis-
cussion of sample studies which purport to determine the system's ac-
curacy seems necessary. One sample study consisting of 500,000 screened
passengers produced the following results: only 1,406, or .28 percent,
of the passengers screened exhibited "selectee behavior." Of those ex-
hibiting "selectee" traits, 694 were nevertheless permitted to board the
aircraft having failed to activate the magnetometer; leaving 712 or .14
percent to be interviewed. Of the 712 passengers interviewed, only
283, or 20 percent of those originally exhibiting "selectee" behavior
were frisked. Of the 283, only twenty persons were denied boarding
and, of these, a mere sixteen were arrested. 40 In another sample of
226,000 screened passengers, .57 percent exhibited "selectee" traits,
and of these only half or .28 percent were interviewed and only .13
percent were searched. Of those searched, only twenty-four persons
were denied boarding.41 In a third study, of a total of 441,000 persons
screened, 303 fit the hijacker behavioral profile, but only nine arrests
were made.
42
New Type of Second-Harmonic Flux-Gate Magnetometer, Communication and
Electronics (Mar. 1962).
Id. at 1085.
39. Id. at 1083.




The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects an individual from unreasonable searches and seizures. A search
is deemed reasonable if conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon
probable cause. 43 The lack of a warrant does not necessarily render a
search or seizure unreasonable. The courts have long recognized a
limited number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. As long as
an arrest is lawful, a warrantless search incident to that arrest is sanc-
tioned.44 Moreover, warrantless searches are deemed reasonable if made
with the consent of an accused,45 or if made in hot pursuit of a sus-
pect.46 Furthermore, the courts have recently sanctioned a stop and
frisk procedure which permits a law enforcement official to search an
individual in a public place when the search is based upon a reason-
able suspicion rather than probable cause.
47
In analyzing the constitutionality of the current anti-hijacking
security system, the first issue which must be resolved is the applicability
of specific permissible search categories. The narrower issue for de-
termination is whether the use of the magnetometer coupled with the
hijacker behavioral profile constitutes a full-blown search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, or merely a stop and frisk. There
is little doubt that, in light of the sample studies discussed above, there
does not exist probable cause to search each and every potential passen-
ger. Moreover, the traditional requirement for a search warrant in order
to effectuate a valid search cannot be reasonably required due to the
exigencies of the situation. The anti-hijacking security system man-
dates swift and effective police action and would be rendered ineffec-
tual by compliance with the time-consuming warrant procedure. Since
no probable cause exists to arrest a potential passenger prior to his
entering the surveillance areas, a search of the passenger can in no way
be classified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Thus, there are
only two possible categories within which the currently used security
system may be said to operate with constitutional validity. The first is
that of consent. The Government has contended that, because signs
43. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
44. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
45. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
46. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
47. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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are posted in certain airports advising: "Passengers and Baggage Sub-
ject to Search," a search of a passenger based on the principal of im-
plied consent is constitutionally permissible. Yet, under the current
procedure there is no evidence that each potential passenger has vol-
untarily and knowledgeably consented to a search. Judge Weinstein of
the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, cor-
rectly analyzed the current situation regarding consent when he stated:
The government has argued that continuing the boarding process after
reading the posted and clearly observable signs which state "PASSEN-
GERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO SEARCH" amounts to im-
plied consent to search . . . . There was no evidence of expressed
consent such as found in Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628, 66
S. Ct. 1277, 1279, 90 L. Ed 2d 1477 (1946), vacated on rehearing with-
out stating grounds, 330 U.S. 800, 67 S. Ct. 857, 91 L. Ed 2d 1259
(1947). Consent to a search involves a relinquishment of fundamental
constitutional rights and should not be lightly inferred. United States v.
Como, 340 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Viale,
312 F.2d 595, 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903, 83 S. Ct.
1291, 10 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1963) .... The government has failed to sus-
tain its burden of establishing any sort of voluntary consent. The evi-
dence shows only that the defendant did not resist or protest when the
Marshals asked him to accompany them to the private area adjacent
to the loading ramp for a search. Such conduct by one who may think
himself in custody . . . hardly amounts to an "unequivocal, specific,
and intelligently given" consent.48
As a result, the only recognized exception to the search warrant require-
ment which may be applicable to constitutionally validate the security
procedures currently in effect is the stop and frisk principle.
In order to determine whether the stop and frisk rationale is ap-
plicable in the anti-hijacking security system and, if applicable, is con-
stitutionally sound, the question of whether the use of the magnetometer
in and of itself constitutes a search or a frisk must first be resolved. The
second issue for consideration is whether the magnetometer, when
coupled with the behavioral profile constitutes a full-blown search
or merely a stop and frisk. More specifically, resolution of the second
issue turns upon whether a positive behavioral profile reading consti-
tutes the reasonable suspicion requirement which is mandated by the
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.4 9 Lastly, the percentage of reliability
exhibited thus far by the "profile" must be scrutinized in order to de-
48. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
49. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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termine its ability to rise to the level of a justification for the physical
intrusion entailed in a frisk.
It is submitted that the use of a magnetometer in and of itself
amounts to a full-blown search. By its use, law enforcement officials
engage in a careful exploration of not only the outer surfaces of a per-
son's clothing but in an intrusive search of the possessions on his per-
son, as well as of his hand luggage. Since in the usual boarding situa-
tion 0 there is no independent probable cause to arrest a potential pas-
senger and since a search warrant is rarely available, the use of the mag-
netometer in and of itself clearly falls outside the permissible boundaries
of the fourth amendment and constitutes an unreasonable search and
seizure. Given this much, the question which remains is: Does the addi-
tion of the behavioral profile to the use of the magnetometer lend con-
stitutional validity to its employment? A positive behavioral profile
reading becomes critical because, unlike the ordinary stop and frisk,
the law enforcement agent usually does not make firsthand observations
of the "selectee." This delicate and intricate task is entrusted to air-
line personnel; it is their observations rather than those of the United
States Marshals which initiate the security process.
In light of the sample studies discussed above, 51 there is little
doubt that the mere designation of a potential passenger as a "selectee"
does not amount to probable cause to arrest. This, however, is not con-
clusive. However, since the reasonable suspicion test involves some-
thing less than probable cause, there is substantial reason to believe
that the present detection system may be justified under the stop and
frisk rationale of Terry. In that case, the Court indicated that some-
thing more than a mere hunch is necessary in order to justify a stop
and frisk;5 2 however, the Court failed to definitely state the percentage
of reliability necessary to satisfy the fourth amendment's requirement
of reasonableness.
There are countervailing arguments which may be advanced as to
whether a positive indication by the behavioral profile constitutes the
reasonable suspicion necessary for a law enforcement agent to engage
in a stop and frisk. On the one hand, the profile's limited utility is evi-
50. In some situations such as that in United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 415
(W.D. Tex. 1969), the court held that probable cause for arrest was present. In Brown,
an airline ticket agent observed the defendant dropping what he believed to be a
weapon. This information was relayed to a security officer who possessed the police
powers necessary to arrest the defendant.
51. See text at supra notes 40-42.
52. 392 U.S. at 27.
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dent, as even a cursory examination of the samplings discussed above
suggests, by the small percentage of successful discoveries produced in
reliance upon the profile. On the other hand, in light of the magnitude
of the hijacking problem and the grave risks to human life which it
entails, the percentage of successful deterrence may be sufficient to with-
stand constitutional attack. Moreover, it may be argued that a positive
indication in light of the behavioral profile is of greater reliability than
the factors which ordinarily have been held to constitute reasonable
suspicion, and which are relied upon by law enforcement agents to
justify a stop and frisk.
The recent case of Adams v. Williams,53 decided by the Supreme
Court in June 1972, considerably diluted the quantum of suspicion
necessary to engage in a stop and frisk. Previously, a stop and frisk
was generally permitted in those instances when a trained police
officer observed conduct which, in light of his investigatory ability and
experience, amounted to a reasonable suspicion that a crime had or
was about to be committed. In Adams, the Court held that the reason-
able suspicion necessary to conduct a stop and frisk may originate even
from an unidentified passerby. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated in the
majority opinion:
[W]e reject respondent's argument that reasonable cause for a stop and
frisk can only be based on the officer's personal observation, rather
than on information supplied by another person. Informants' tips, like
all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene,
may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One simple rule will
not cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia
of reliability, would either warant no police response or require further
investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.
But in some situations-for example when the victim of a street crime
seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or
when a credible informant warns of a specific impending crime-the
subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police
response.
54
While the ramifications of this decision are as yet unclear, its holding
has considerably enlarged the investigatory powers of law enforce-
ment.
The currently deployed anti-hijacking security system is initiated
by airline personnel rather than by law enforcement officers, with the
53. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
54. Id. at 147.
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concomitant danger that this task may be either abused or incompe-
tently performed by poorly trained personnel. Nonetheless, in light of
the Court's decision in Adams, the constitutionality of the procedure is
apparently sound. There seems to be little doubt that if the observa-
tions and information supplied by a civilian may constitute grounds for
a permissible stop and frisk,55 then certainly the observations of airline
personnel would serve as a constitutionally permissible basis for the
initiation of the security process. Unlike the ordinary citizen, airline
employees receive some training in screening out would-be perpetrators.
Moreover, they are supplied with a list of objective criteria which, if
applied correctly, do not discriminate against any group.
Furthermore, it may be argued that the profile analysis is no more
than the collection of traits and mannerisms indicative of "furtive be-
havior." That an experienced officer may reasonably frisk on the basis
of certain furtive characteristics displayed by a suspect has been clearly
established in Terry.56 In the ordinary stop and frisk encounter the frisk
is the outcome of the subjective perception of the officer or of his
informant. On the other hand, there may some validity to the argu-
ment that reliance upon objective criteria, which are both readily
available and devoid of prejudice, provides greater reliability. Yet,
there is a substantial danger inherent in the deployment of the current
procedure. The reliance upon certain undisclosed characteristics gives
rise to a situation in which the employment of various marginally scien-
tific profiles could be justified as tools necessary for the detection of
potential hijackers. Thus, the fourth amendment's protection against
55. See, e.g., People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 229 N.E.2d 581, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1967) (anonymous telephone caller gave police description of a youth standing on a
corner with a loaded gun in his jacket pocket). See also People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441,
201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); Bell v.
United States, 280 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (police stopped a man at 4:30 a.m.
running from an alley at the same time they heard a woman screaming for help).
56. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court stated:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently danger-
ous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons




unreasonable searches and seizures might be jeopardized. Moreover,
at least one case in which the security system has been applied has dem-
onstrated its susceptibility to abuse and its potential to work a serious
denial of equal protection under the law. 7
The standard which governs whether a governmental intrusion
of the privacy of an individual is reasonable and hence constitutionally
sound, was enunciated by the Court in Terry when it stated:
In order to assess the reasonableness of [the officer's] conduct as a gen-
eral proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitu-
tionally protected interests of the private citizen," for there is "no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search
[or seizure] entails."58
In his lenghty opinion in United States v. Lopez, 0 Judge Weinstein
analyzed with admirable clarity some of the factors which must be taken
into consideration in determining the reasonableness of the currently
used anti-hijacking security system. Judge Weinstein stated:
A reviewing court must: (1) determine the objective evidence then
available to the law enforcement officer and (2) decide what level of
probability existed that the individual was armed and about to engage
in dangerous conduct; it must then rule whether that level of probabil-
ity justified the 'frisk' in light of (3) the manner in which the frisk
57. In United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court
stated:
While evidence discovered during a frisk pursuant to this anti-hijacking
procedure would normally be admissible, the special circumstances of the instant
case require suppression. The Pan American Passenger Service Manager issued
a memorandum on July 22, 1970 purporting "to update" the "profile" to be
applied in the anti-hijacking screening procedure. This action was not author-
ized by Pan American Security Services, the United States Marshal Service,
or the Federal Aeronautics Administration. It eliminated one criterion included
in the official profile established by the F.A.A. and added two additional
categories.
The one characteristic eliminated by this supplemental memorandum effec-
tively excised from the screening procedure one of the fundamental character-
istics of hijackers as described by Dr. Dailey in camera testimony. One of the
characteristics added introduced an ethnic element for which there is no ex-
perimental basis, thus raising serious equal protection problems. The second
added criterion called for an act of individual judgment on the part of air-
line employees. The effect of these changes was to destroy the essential
neutrality and objectivity of the approved profile.
Id. at 1101.
58. 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
59. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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was conducted as bearing on the resentment it might justifiably arouse
in the person frisked (assuming he is not about to engage in criminal
conduct) and (4) the risk to the officer and the community of not dis-
arming the individual at once.60
The application of these factors to the present hijacking situation
may well justify the currently used security system. Few would dispute
the gravity of the threat posed both to the American flying public and
to civil aviation in general by the hijacking menace. The recent maim-
ings and killings merely serve to give fresh emphasis to what is an ever
present danger. If law enforcement is to effectively deter the potential
hijacker, his plans must be thwarted prior to his boarding the air-
craft. The current use of "sky marshals" on selected flights is clearly
a stopgap measure. In view of the overwhelming need to protect those
who use American aircraft as well as to ensure the regularity of our
air schedules, the scope of the intrusion caused by the security system
is minimal and may, at most, be classed as a petty indignity. The per-
sonal inconvenience to each passenger is so slight that the majority are
not even aware that a security system is in operation. Even if reliance
upon the behavioral profile and the magnetometer indicates the neces-
sity of a frisk, the "selectee" is searched in a private area. This is a far
cry from the impositions described by the Court in Terry. There the
Court stated: "[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure per-
formed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, per-
haps facing a wall with his hands raised is a 'petty indignity.' "61
When correctly applied, the anti-hijacking system does not dis-
criminate against any racial, ethnic, or religious group. Moreover, the
degree of community resentment aroused by the current system is mini-
mal. Rather than resenting the system, the vast majority of the flying
public welcomes its use, recognizing that its deployment is primarily for
their own protection.
62
It is submitted that Judge Weinstein was correct in his approval of
the current security system when he stated in the Lopez case:
Based upon the surveys available, out of every approximately 15 per-
60. Id. at 1097.
61. 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
62. In 1969, the F.A.A. instituted a Task Force to study the hijacking problem.
One of its many assignments was to study the public reaction to the anti-hijacking
system. The Task Force concluded that "public reaction is highly favorable." The Task
Force further reported that not a single passenger complained when he was aware that
he was uider observation. See AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Dec. 29, 1969,
at 32.
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sons who are frisked one person is found with a weapon. Thus the
probability that any person who is selected to be frisked has a weapon
is approximately 6%. We know that the frisk is conducted in private
with as much courtesy as the circumstances permit and that those who
are frisked and allowed to go on their way generally welcome the pro-
tective measures taken in their behalf rather than resent them. The
substantial interest in preserving the integrity and safety of air travel
by preventing hijackings is obvious. In light of the circumstances a
6% danger of arms suffices to justify a frisk.
The statistics . . . indicate that only somewhere on the order of
one-tenth of 1% of all passengers are actually frisked and that included
in that 1% are practically all of the potential hijackers. The procedure,
as designed, operates on purely objective criteria independent of race,
color, or creed. It is well calculated to winnow out potential hijackers
while occcasioning a bare minimum of inconvenience to a very small
percentage of the flying public-an inconvenience which most subjects
seem, in fact, to accept. A United States Marshal would be imprudent
were he to refuse to heed the warning given to him by the system.
A narrowly circumscribed protective weapons "pat down" or "frisk"
is constitutionally permissible under these circumstances. 3
CONCLUSION
While the currently used anti-hijacking security system may be
said to be constitutionally valid in light of the stop and frisk rationale,
it has not eliminated the skyjacking menace. Apparently, the constitu-
tionality of the system is totally dependent upon the validity of the
"hijacker behavioral profile." The reliability of the profile analysis, in
light of the sample studies discussed above, is at best marginal. More-
over, its components are shrouded in secrecy and are readily subject to
abuse. In addition, the security system as currently constituted can
only detect the presence of ferrous metals. A person bent on skyjacking
an aircraft may use a variety of instruments such as incendiary devices,
tear gas pens, etc., which are not subject to detection. Furthermore,
under the present system, a potential passenger who fits "selectee" re-
quirements and who activates a magnetometer may still evade the se-
curity process if he decides not to attempt to board the aircraft when
a search by a United States Marshal is requested. This procedure cre-
ates the substantial danger that one who has intended to hijack an air-
craft may leave the airport only to try again another day.
In light of the fact that the hijacking problem has not ceased,
63. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1097 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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the danger exists that the so-called profile analysis would be either
abused or enlarged in such a fashion as to substantially detract from
what it now constitutes-a collective number of objectively selected
traits believed sufficient to determine reasonable suspicion. In the re-
cent past, hijackers have come from varied backgrounds, nationalities,
and ethnic groups. It is most difficult at the present time to glean and to
synthesize the common characteristics which they possessed other than
their goal. A situation may thus arise where a potential passenger who
activates the magnetometer would be frisked merely on the whim of
an airline employee or a United States Marshal. These reservations are
not meant to imply that no protective searches should be undertaken.
Quite to the contrary, it is suggested that the current number of
searches should be expanded in light of the ubiquitous danger of
hijacking. It is submitted, however, that these searches could and must
be conducted within the confines of the fourth amendment.
Under the current system, the consent rationale advanced by the
Government does not amount to consent freely and voluntarily given
and thus falls outside the contours of the fourth amendment. However,
if the requested consent occurred substantially earlier in the departure
procedure, it might better withstand constitutional attack. Thus, the
consent should be requested at the time a ticket is purchased. At this
point, whether at an airport ticket counter or at the desk of a travel
agency, the personnel who are engaged in the sale of tickets should warn
the prospective passenger that his consent to be searched at the airport
is a precondition of his boarding the aircraft. In addition, the ticket
itself should indicate, in large print and in clear terms, that among the
conditions of carriage is consent to be searched. Furthermore, the
signs which now advise boarding passengers of a possible search should
be retained. A final assurance that the consent to search is freely and vol-
untarily given may be obtained by the execution of a consent form at
the time the ticket is purchased.
The consent procedure suggested above satisfies the constitutional
requirement that a consent to be searched must be knowingly and
voluntarily given. Unlike the situation where a potential passenger
activates the magnetometer, no law enforcement agent is present at the
time of ticket purchase, and no request to undergo an immediate search
or frisk is made. When the passenger indicates his consent and signs
the requisite form, the choice is truly his as to whether he wishes to
undergo the pre-boarding process. If he is unwilling to subject him-
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self to the scrutiny of the security system, he is free to refrain from
boarding. The coercive effect inherent in the presence of law enforce-
ment personnel, which has been deemed by some of our courts to ih-
validate consent searches, 64 is totally absent.
On the other hand, after having been explicitly informed that one
of the conditions of carriage by an airline is a possible search, if a
traveler attempting to bring contraband abroad a plane is searched
by a United States Marshal, he cannot subsequently contend that his
consent was coerced. The critical point in determining whether a con-
sent was voluntarily and knowingly given is the time of its request.00
Its effect has never been held to depend on whether contraband is
found. Nor can a potential passenger claim that he voluntarily and
knowingly consented to a possible search of his person and luggage
at the time that he purchased his ticket, but had subsequently changed
his mind. The attempt to board constitutes prima facie proof that he
accepted the conditions of the contract of carriage.
Under the currently employed security system it is uncertain
whether the checked baggage of a potential passenger may be constitu-
tionally fluoroscoped, x-rayed, or searched. When a potential passenger
reaches the airport, unless probable cause exists that he is, has, or, is
about to commit a crime, no probable cause for his arrest is present.
At such time, a search of his checked baggage may be constitutionally
invalid. Moreover, even were the passenger classified as a "selectee" at
the boarding gate, an argument could be made that baggage not car-
ried by him is not subject to a valid search. In light of the landmark
case of Chimel v. California,"6 a search conducted pursuant to a lawful
arrest may only be made of objects within the immediate control of
the suspect. Checked baggage is certainly not within the permissible
scope envisioned by Chimel. While one might argue that the presence
of exigent circumstances and the difficulties entailed in the warrant
procedure are sufficient to remove a search of airport baggage from the
Chimel rationale, one might justify such searches by drawing analogies
to comparable searches such as those performed at customs checkpoints
0 7
64. See, e.g., Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
65. See, e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (consent must be
proved by clear and convincing testimony and it must be established that there is no
duress or coercion in the obtaining of the consent either actual or implied).
66. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
67. It has long been held that customs officers, on the basis of mere suspicion alone,
may stop and frisk individuals entering the country. While the requirement of reason-
ableness controls even in the case of customs searches, customs officials have traditionally
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or under the Munitions Act.68 Yet, it is submitted that the formulation
of such rationales as well as the drawing of the previously mentioned
analogies is unnecessary when searches are performed in accordance
with the aforementioned consent procedures.
Under the suggested consent rationale, one of the methods in de-
termining who to search may still be the currently used behavioral
profile and magnetometer system. However, it is submitted that if the
hijacking problem is to be effectively eliminated and threats to equal
protection obviated, every potential passenger should be frisked and
each piece of baggage subjected to x-ray or search. It seems preposter-
ous that in the hope of raising revenue and thwarting smuggling, an
extensive search of incoming baggage is made, while no search or a
haphazard one at best, is undertaken of outgoing baggage whose con-
tents may cause serious injury or death. Furthermore, since it has long
been held that both a frisk and a search conducted in good faith to lo-
cate weapons will justify the seizure of evidence of other crimes, a
resultant increase in the confiscation of other contraband may be an-
ticipated. There are a number of cases such as Stanley v. Georgia,69
been given a wide latitude by our courts. The courts have held, in effect, that there is
reason to search every person entering the United States from a foreign port on the
basis of such entry alone. See, e.g., United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); Landau v. United States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665 (1936). While the possibility exists that the customs search
rationale may be applicable to the situation at hand, customs searches have traditionally
been held to apply only to incoming persons and baggage. See 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970)
which provides:
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop,
search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any
vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is
merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into
the United States in any manner contrary to law . . .; and if any such officer
or other person so authorized shall find any merchandise on or about any such
vehicle . . . which he shall have reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty,
or to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States ... he shall seize
and secure the same for trial.
68. See 22 U.S.C. § 401 (a) (1970) which provides:
Whenever an attempt is made to export or ship from or take out of the United
States any arms or munitions of war or other articles in violation of law, or
whenever it is known or there shall be probable cause to believe that any arms
or munitions of war or other articles are intended to be or are being or have
been exported or removed from the United States in violation of law, the
Secretary of the Treasury, or any other person duly authorized for the purpose
by the president, may seize and detain such arms or munitions of war or other
articles ....
For an interesting discussion of the applicability of this, as well as the customs search
rationale, see Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 1039, 1050-52 (1971).
69. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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Harris v. United States,70 and Klor v. Hannon,71 standing for the propo
sition that an officer who constitutionally searches for materials con-
cerning one crime and comes upon evidence constituting another may
validly seize that evidence.
As has been stated, the constitutional right to travel would not be
a bar to the newly suggested consent procedure. Furthermore, a com
mercial airline may be considered a common carrier and, as such, owes
the highest duty of care to its potential passengers3 2 It has been stated
that this duty of care extends to the protection of passengers trans-
ported by common carriers from violence by both third parties and
other passengers.73 The newly suggested consent procedure would sub,
stantially facilitate the accomplishment of this duty and the attainment
of the ultimate goal of protecting the passengers and crews of our na-
tion's airlines.
70. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled on other grounds, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
71. 278 F. Supp. 359 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
72. Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacker Aircraft, 21 BUFFALO
L. REv. 339 (1972).
73. Id.
